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The scholarship on Frantz Fanon’s theorization of violence is crowded with
interpretations that follow the Arendtian paradigm of violence. These
interpretations often discuss whether violence is instrumental or non-
instrumental in Fanon’s work. This reading, I believe, is the result of
approaching Fanon through Hannah Arendt’s framing of violence, i.e.
through a binary paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental
violence. Even some Fanon scholars who question Arendt’s reading of
Fanon, do so by employing a similar binary logic, hence repeating the same
either/or paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental violence. I aim
to challenge such interpretations of Fanon by demonstrating that in the
context of anticolonial armed struggle in which Fanon writes, the either/or
framework of the instrumental/non-instrumental binary of violence cannot
fully capture his perspective. Violence can indeed be conceived as having
both constructive and instrumental aspects. My argument is supported by
Fanon’s corpus, including his 1960 Accra speech, “Why We Use Violence”
in Alienation and Freedom. This piece, I suggest, together with Fanon’s
other writings, poses a direct challenge to the Arendtian binary of violence.
My analysis resists positioning the difference between Arendt and Fanon
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notion of “frame” I complicate their difference and argue Arendt’s framing
of violence prevents her from apprehending Fanon and – more importantly
– interpretations of Fanon based on this Arendtian frame of violence
inevitably lead to misinterpretations.
Introduction
The scholarship on Frantz Fanon’s theorization of violence is crowded with
interpretations that follow the Arendtian paradigm of violence (e.g. Oladipo
1989; Kawash 1999; Roberts 2004; Frazer and Hutchings 2008; Ayyash
2013). These interpretations often discuss whether violence is instrumental
or non-instrumental in Fanon’s work. This approach, I believe, is the result
of reading Fanon through Hannah Arendt’s framing of violence, i.e.
through a binary paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental violence.
Arendt’s own characterization of violence is instrumental, while she claims
that for Fanon violence is non-instrumental (Arendt 1970). Even some Fano-
nians who question Arendt’s reading of Fanon do so by employing a similar
binary logic, hence repeating the same either/or logic of instrumental versus
non-instrumental violence.1
My aim here is to challenge such interpretations of Fanon by demon-
strating that in the context of anticolonial armed struggle in which
Fanon writes, the either/or framework of the instrumental/non-instrumen-
tal binary of violence cannot fully capture his perspective. Violence can
indeed be conceived as having both constructive and instrumental
aspects. Hence, my analysis resists positioning the difference between
Arendt and Fanon through the either–or logic of the instrumental/non-
instrumental binary. I use Judith Butler’s notion of “frames of violence”2
to complicate their difference and argue Arendt’s framing of violence pre-
vents her from apprehending Fanon and – more importantly – interpret-
ations of Fanon based on this Arendtian frame of violence inevitably
lead to misinterpretations. My argument is supported by Fanon’s
corpus, including his 1960 Accra speech, “Why We Use Violence” (“Pour-
quoi nous employons la violence”), published in Alienation and Freedom
(Fanon 2018). Fanon’s frame of violence as formulated in this piece,
together with his other writings, poses a direct challenge to the Arendtian
binary framework.
My proposal to retrieve two distinct frames of violence from Fanon and
Arendt’s theorizations serves the purpose of sharpening the visibility of dis-
sident voices in the narrativization of violence. This in turn highlights the dis-
symmetry in how we engage with and affectively respond to the subjects and
the contexts of violence. Although both thinkers consider violence as part of
experience, Fanon’s position is much more focused on the effects of violence
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on the victims of colonial violence. His affective responsiveness, to borrow
Butler’s term, is shaped by a theoretical commitment to exploring what vio-
lence does to the subjectivity of the person who is surrounded by a violent
world.3 The question of how the colonized can eliminate this violent world
cannot be divorced from Fanon’s affective theoretical engagement. In con-
trast, Arendt’s framing of violence does not capture the structural/everyday
violence that Fanon is concerned with.4 Within Arendt’s discussions of vio-
lence, the effects of everyday violence she tends to neglect concern racial dis-
crimination and violence (e.g. in the US), slavery and practices of social
exclusion (e.g. Ancient Greece) and torture, detention and institutional
racism (e.g. in Algeria).
The significance of discussing the sources and implications of different
frames of violence resides in making sense of contradictory responses to
state violence in the contemporary global context. One current example is
the Turkish–Kurdish conflict. Some scholars characterize the institutiona-
lized violence against the Kurds as colonial.5 Many Kurds and Turks living
in Turkey and abroad view the Kurdish armed struggle as the inevitable
outcome of long-term Turkish state violence against the Kurds. In contrast,
the majority of the Turkish public endorse the opinion, sanctioned by the
Turkish state, that the Kurdish guerillas (PKK) are terrorists. In many
ways, this view mirrors the 1960s official French discourse about the
National Liberation Front of Algeria, on account of which the everyday
implications of the French–Algerian colonial relation for the colonized
were not apparent to many Europeans. This similarity alone suggests the
current relevance of Fanon’s frame of violence for anticolonial movements
across the Global South and offers a positive response to Nigel Gibson’s
(1999, 101) question, “Does Fanon have a relevance beyond the Anglo-
American Academy?”6
Fanon’s insights on the question of violence not only disturb the
liberal understanding of violence that sees the nation-state as the sole
executor of violence, but they also reject the liberal configuration of
the political sphere as antithetical to violence, which we repeatedly
find in Arendtian interpretations. The liberal view, supported by
Arendt’s distinction between the social and political spheres, is also
prevalent in the recent attempts to criminalize and persecute civil
public protests, for example, in the United States with the Black Lives
Matter movement, in France with the Yellow Vests movement, and in
Turkey with the Gezi Park protests. The criminalization of public pro-
tests is tied to the idea of the nation-state as the primary guarantor and
protector of the public welfare. This idea is challenged by postcolonial
theories’ intrusions, which render visible the racially specific distribution
of violence and protection within both Global North and Global
South states.
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In what follows, I first discuss Arendt’s criticism of Fanon, followed by her
views of violence as antithetical to politics. In exploring Arendt’s views, I
mark their difference from Fanon’s. Secondly, I depict Fanon’s frame of vio-
lence. This is followed by a critical engagement with two Fanon scholars,
both of whom, I argue, offer Arendtian interpretations that I find to be
missing the spirit of Fanon’s judgments about violence.
Arendt’s frame: violence as opposed to politics
In On Violence Arendt informs her reader that she is reflecting on Fanon’s
The Wretched of the Earth “because of its great influence on the present
student generation” (1970, 14). The “great influence” concerns the students’
willingness to resort to violence. On Violence was written as a critical reflec-
tion on the 1968 student riots in Europe and the US and it is in this context
that Arendt takes issue with Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre and George Sorel, as
leading thinkers who, Arendt suggests, defend violence for its own sake.
To clarify her own position on violence, she concludes “violence is by
nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance
and justification through the end it pursues” (51). Violence is instrumental,
for Arendt, in the sense that it can only be a means to a political goal,
where the goal itself must be communicated through speech. According to
Christopher Finlay, “instrumental justification thus appears as a key criterion
for Arendt in distinguishing her account of permissible violence from the the-
ories of Sorel, Fanon and others” (2009, 29). Although Arendt does not expli-
citly state that, for Fanon, violence is not instrumental, she does express that
Fanon “glorifies violence for violence’s sake” (1970, 65).7 She also adds that,
for Fanon, “violence is justified on the ground of creativity” (75). Here, she is
critical of Fanon because she is opposed to the idea of creation through vio-
lence. Arendt’s framing of violence suggests violence in itself is not capable of
changing anything and cannot have any positive configuration. The main
point of Arendt’s criticism of Fanon and others, then, is that they miss the
instrumental nature of violence; instead, they maintain a non-instrumental
vision of violence.
In her other works, too, Arendt sustains the idea that violence is instrumen-
tal. On two different occasions (1998, 26; 2006, 9), she speaks of violence as
instrumental through its lack of speech. The muteness of violence issues from
its instrumental nature: violence needs to be supplemented by a discourse that
will serve as a justification. Arendt’s characterization of violence as instru-
mental and speechless is essential to her opposition of politics and violence.
Another crucial aspect of Arendt’s thinking about violence, one that comes
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In On Revolution she argues every political beginning presupposes violence
(Arendt 2006, 10). For us, then, the question will be this: given that
Arendt is aware of the necessity of violent beginnings for political entities
and justifies violence when there is a further political goal, why does she
deny Fanon legitimacy in his call for armed struggle against colonial
powers? Why does Fanon appear to Arendt to be someone who praises vio-
lence for its own sake? In the context of colonialism, the very context where
Fanon writes, are not the violent uprisings of the colonized a means to
national independence, and therefore a legitimate political goal according
to Arendt?
Kathryn T. Gines argues that “Arendt is aware of the violence used to
establish and maintain what she calls imperialism, and yet she is not as criti-
cal of the oppressors’ violence as she is of the revolutionary counterviolence
of the colonized” (2014, 99). In agreement with Gines and further, it is my
contention that Arendt’s affective response is unresponsive to the effects of
colonial violence, such that she does not see anticolonial armed struggle as
a justified political means.
The notion of affective responsiveness is key for demarcating Fanon and
Arendt’s frames of violence. In Butler’s formulation, affective responsiveness
does not simply mean an individual’s affective response to a situation, “but a
way of responding to what is before us with the resources that are available to
us” (2010, 50). Butler argues that affective responsiveness is conditioned by
framing, where the recognizability of the targets of violence depends on that
framing. Butler thus suggests framing produces one’s affective response to
and interpretation of violent actions (34). In this respect, Arendt’s framing
of violence, and therefore her affective response to colonial violence, relies
on her depiction of the social and the political as two distinct spheres, as I
demonstrate below.
It is worth noting that calling into question Arendt’s responsiveness to
human suffering in the French colonies might seem unjustified given the
fact that as a Jewish thinker and Holocaust survivor, she dedicated her
life’s work to analyzing and understanding political evil, totalitarian
regimes, statelessness and collective responsibility.8 Regardless of Arendt’s
longstanding interest in these issues, her framework appears to be
unequipped to address the effects of everyday violence on colonized people.
In The Human Condition Arendt defines political action in terms of speech
and collective public reasoning and juxtaposes it to violence: “to be political,
to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and per-
suasion and not through violence” (1998, 26). This appeal to speech as the
distinctive characteristic of politics is Aristotelian. According to this distinc-
tion, only those who are entitled to speech are rendered fully human. The
entitlement to speech distinguishes the political actor from the rest, such
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and women) was allowed to participate in the political life. Hence, the Aris-
totelian understanding of the political sphere is based on the exclusion of a
certain group of individuals. These Aristotelian distinctions and categoriz-
ations are at the heart of Arendt’s understanding of the political sphere. In
The Promise of Politics, Arendt (2007, 116) notes the political sphere under-
stood by Aristotle excluded both slaves and the barbarians. The political
equality of Greek citizens, therefore, required the exclusion of a group of
individuals from the political sphere and citizenship.
Although Arendt is not expressing approval, she is aware this exclusion
was a necessary precondition for political life in Ancient Greece: “the point
of exploitation of slaves in classical Greece was to liberate their masters
entirely from labor so that they might enjoy the freedom of the political
arena” (2007, 117). She is thus clear that the institution of slavery made poss-
ible the emergence of the political sphere and equal citizenship in ancient
Athens. Arendt’s discussion of the Greek polis, then, makes evident her rec-
ognition of the presence of institutional exclusion and exploitation within
ancient Greek society. What is relevant for us is that the recognition itself
is not accompanied by any ethical judgment. Although Arendt doesn’t
approve of these practices, neither does she condemn them. Her point may
be to distinguish the social sphere (i.e. the sphere of hierarchy, necessity,
and coercion) from the political sphere (i.e. the sphere of equality and
freedom), but as a result, her analysis remains devoid of any reference to
the inequalities and violence inherent in the social sphere.
According to UdayMehta (2010, 44), Arendt was well aware that securing
political freedom required ignoring the substantial questions regarding social
inequality, especially in the case of America. Mehta’s point is particularly apt
in relation to Arendt’s analysis in “Reflections on Little Rock” (Arendt 1959).
This short text by Arendt shows that her understanding of politics does not in
any way secure equality and justice in the social realm. As Gines puts it,
“Arendt’s delineation of the Negro question as a social issue prevents her
from recognizing that anti-Black racism (like Jew hatred) is a political
phenomenon” (2014, 1–2).
In line with the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision to outlaw the segregation
of schools, in 1957 nine African American students enrolled in the segregated
Little Rock Central High School. Arendt’s essay “Reflections on Little Rock”
is concerned with “the crisis” that followed. Arendt (1959, 50) is explicitly
critical of federal enforcement of desegregation in schools. Arendt does not
see this social inequality (i.e. segregation) as a political problem because
she sees the social sphere as not functioning on the grounds of equality. To
clarify this position, she makes a distinction between “discrimination” as
the principle of society and “equality” as the principle of politics. She
writes, “what equality is to the body politic – its innermost principle – dis-
crimination is to society” (51).
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According to Viki Bell, Arendt’s view that the social and the political
realms are grounded by two different principles is connected to “her notion
of the political as a realm, which is separate from the social and the
private” (2000, 64). Hence, the political principle of equal citizenship is
not at all the guarantor of equality in the social realm; in fact, discrimination
becomes the central governing principle of society because “without discrimi-
nation of some sort, society would simply cease to exist, and very important
possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear”
(Arendt 1959, 51). Very explicitly, Arendt considers discrimination to be
society’s sine qua non; she naturalizes discrimination by describing it as an
inclination among members of society. Interestingly, her description of dis-
crimination has no negative connotation. Yet, as in the case of segregation
of schools, social discrimination might lead to inequality in citizenship
rights, i.e. within the political sphere. This point does not rise to the level
of a concern for Arendt because she disregards the interconnectedness
between the social and the political spheres. In the context of “Reflections
on Little Rock”, this analytic separation of the social from the political has
immediate effects in Arendt’s narrative; the separation enables the normaliza-
tion of exclusionary practices within society (i.e. segregation in schools) and
elides from the account the effects these practices have on those who are vio-
lated by them.
Arendt’s framing of the relation between violence and politics, which I
have outlined above, suggests her framework is not equipped to address
the effects of racially and geographically specific operations of everyday vio-
lence in colonial contexts. Next, I focus on Fanon’s frame of violence through
Arendt’s criticism.
Fanon’s frame: multidimensional and beyond the Arendtian paradigm
To identify the national liberation movements with such outbursts is to prophesy
their doom – quite apart from the fact that the unlikely victory would not result
in changing the world (or the system), but only its personnel. (Arendt 1970, 21,
emphasis mine)9
Arendt’s statement is intended as a criticism against Fanon. Yet Arendt’s
claim, that victory achieved through violence merely changes the personnel,
misses the point that Fanon makes in his various writings, because in a colo-
nial world, it is precisely the attitude of the colonizer (the personnel) that is
the problem. Therefore, Arendt’s assertion that changing the personnel
don’t matter disregards the racially specific operations of colonial violence.
Colonialism, as a practice of government, is sustained and maintained by
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extreme forms of violence targeting racially specific bodies (e.g. Muslims in
Algeria, Blacks in South Africa) and, as Fanon states in Toward the
African Revolution, “colonialism cannot be understood without the possi-
bility of torturing, of violating, or of massacring” (1967, 66). This is why,
according to Fanon, changing the personnel, i.e. getting rid of the colonizer
through violent struggle, will be the first and necessary step. Primarily,
Fanon is interested in the effects of colonial violence on the psychic formation
of colonized individuals.10 In almost all of his writings, Fanon emphasizes
that the damage done by the colonizer is not limited to physical violence.
The colonized individual lives in an environment where violence is constant,
multidimensional and diffused into everyday life.11
Fanon’s analysis of the psychic impact of everyday violence is one of the
most powerful and insightful elements of his framing of violence, and it
stands at the root of his understanding of armed mobilization. As a black
intellectual from the French colony of Martinique, Fanon’s earlier insights
into the effects of colonial racism and violence, published in Black Skin,
White Masks, gained a specific audience after 1957, when he began to
write in El Moudjahid, the organ of the FLN (National Liberation Front)
of Algeria.12 He remarks in an issue published in September 1957: “the attitude
of the French troops in Algeria fits into a pattern of police domination, of sys-
tematic racism, of dehumanization rationally pursued” (Fanon 1967, 64).
Throughout his writings on Algeria, collected in hisToward the African Revolu-
tion, Fanon repeatedly references the “systematized de-humanization” instituted
by the colonizer (53). This systematic performance of violence structures an
inhuman world inhabited by dehumanized subjects. In The Wretched of the
Earth Fanon continues to emphasize that it is the colonizer who “brings violence
into the homes and minds of the colonized subjects” (2004, 4).
Fanon understands the move from colonialism to anticolonial struggle as
inevitable. According to him, a “society that drives its members to desperate
solutions is a non-viable society, a society to be replaced” (1967, 53). Agree-
ing with Fanon’s assessment that the violence of the colonial world creates
violent subjectivities, Butler identifies two different configurations of violence
in Fanon that emerge from a single violent context (Butler 2006, 13–14; see
also Nayar 2013, 70). The first configuration of violence is the violence
imposed upon the colonized by the settlers. Here, violence is created by the
colonizer and sustains the colonial world. At this level, subjectivities are
constituted dialectically – black/white, the colonized/colonizer, the Arab/
European.13 The dialectical formation of subjectivities is explicitly articu-
lated by Fanon: “It is the racist who creates the inferiorized” (2008, 73,
emphasis in the original) and “it is the colonist who fabricated and continues
to fabricate the colonized subject” (2004, 2, emphasis in the original). Here,
the dialectical relationship between the colonized and the colonizer fits into
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The second configuration of violence is the violence that the colonized
appropriates. Fanon stresses that the effects of the violence of colonial
racism can be weaponized if it can be turned upside down and used as a
means to destroy the colonial world. Channelled into revolutionary politics,
this appropriated violence can lead the colonized to take up violent action
against colonialism itself. This is the sense in which, for Fanon, violence
has a constructive and/or productive effect – when it is used for decoloniza-
tion through armed struggle (2004, 219). Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan articu-
lates this point as follows:
The oppressed who are dehumanized by the violence of the oppressor also turn that
violence against themselves when they lack the consciousness and organization to
fight back. But they regain their identity, reclaim their history… [t]hrough violence,
they remove the primary barrier to their humanity and they rehabilitate themselves.
(Bulhan 1985, 144, emphasis in original)
As Bulhan’s interpretation makes clear, Fanon is not speaking of generating
ex nihilo violent behaviours, tactics and strategies; rather, he is suggesting the
colonized make productive use of the violence that is already given to the
colonized, as she inhabits a violent world. To put it explicitly, the violence
that constitutes the colonized’s subjectivity, and which eventually leads the
colonized to take up all possible forms of violent activity, originates from
colonialism itself. Richard Keller’s interpretation agrees with Bulhan on
this point (also see Bernstein 2013, 110–120). Keller stresses anticolonial vio-
lence is “an appropriation of the violence of the settler turned towards the end
of liberation and the creation of new revolutionary subjects” (2007, 165).
Against the interpretation put forth by some critics, which I will turn to
shortly, I argue this “appropriated violence” is both instrumental and con-
structive. Fanon is explicit about the aim of this violence: he writes that the
anticolonial struggle in Algeria “is aimed both at the death of this [colonial]
configuration and at the creation of a new society” (1967, 64). This suggests
that, for Fanon, violence is necessary, yet it is necessary only in a specific colo-
nial context, as ameans for decolonization (see Nesbitt 2013, 194). It is pre-
cisely this point that escapes the critics who try to fit him into the Arendtian
binary of violence.
According to Fanon, the colonized subject is a violent subject, not only
because she lives in a violent present, but also because her past and her
future are colonized through violent epistemologies, intended to rob her of
her humanity. Addressing this temporal dimension of colonial violence
allows Fanon explicitly to articulate the colonial dehumanization process
and the rehabilitating effect of armed struggle against it. This is brilliantly
and succinctly stated in his 1960 speech at the Accra Positive Action Confer-
ence. This speech, “Pourquoi nous employons la violence”, was translated
other hand, there is
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into English under the title “Why We Use Violence” (hereafter cited as
WWUV) and published in Alienation and Freedom (2018). In particular,
this section of the speech is key in shedding light on how Fanon conceives
of the three-dimensional temporality of colonial violence:
I say that such a system established by violence can logically only be faithful to
itself, and its duration in time depends on the continuation of violence…Colonial-
ism, however, is not satisfied by this violence against the present…The history of
the colonized peoples is transformed into meaningless unrest… [hence, there is]
violence against the past that is emptied of all substance, [and also] violence
against the future, for the colonial regime presents itself as necessarily eternal.
We see, therefore, that the colonized people, caught in a web of a three-dimensional
violence,… are soon logically confronted by the problem of ending the colonial
regime by any means necessary. (Fanon 2018, 654, emphasis mine)
Following Achille Mbembe’s (2017, 106) and Robert J. C. Young’s (2005,
39) readings of this text, where the function of “time” and/or “temporality”
is underscored, I want to dwell further on the temporality14 of colonial vio-
lence because it directly challenges the Arendtian paradigm of violence,
where violence is “mute” and has no positive and/or constructive
configuration.
The first, perhaps obvious, point I want to reiterate regarding Fanon’s
addressing of a three-dimensional violence is that the experience of vio-
lence is never limited to the present moment. Colonial practices deprive
the colonized individual of a meaningful past, as if she had no history
worthy of civilization before the colonial regime. This is also articulated
in The Wretched of the Earth and followed by the suggestion that
“reclaiming the past” “triggers a change of fundamental importance in
the colonized’s psycho-affective equilibrium” (2004, 148). It is because
the colonizer targets the colonized’s past that the epistemological battle
against colonialism requires rewriting the past where there is “dignity,
glory, and sobriety” (148).
The second point concerns the colonized’s future. Although colonial vio-
lence is never limited to the present, as Fanon stresses, nonetheless, it has
the effect of locking one into the present moment and hijacking the future.
This hijacking is the function of physical and epistemic violence; the experi-
ence of futurelessness is shaped by the systematic distribution of everyday
colonial violence as it is felt in the body and soul (Fanon 2018, 655). Here,
in clear opposition to Arendt, Fanon suggests violence is not mute; colonial
violence has a logic of its own and a peculiar temporality that presents
itself as eternal. Hence, colonial violence presents itself to the colonized as
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Fanon’s articulation of colonial violence in WWUV, as embedded in time,
configures a distinctive lens through which one can understand the coexis-
tence of physical, psychic and epistemic violence as dominating time.15
There is yet another dimension to the temporality of violence Fanon
alludes to in this text: the universal yet historical character of anticolonial
violence. He suggests violence perpetrated by the colonized can gain a univer-
sal character when it is “fought with the language of truth and of reason”
(2018, 655). In this text, his example of such violence fought with “truth”
is the Algerian revolution.16 Fanon stresses that Algerians were able to
reclaim their future not by “giving a meaning to his [their] life but rather
of giving one to his [their] death (655).”
Framing violence as a temporal phenomenon in this three-dimensional way
goes beyond the Arendtian formulation of violence as mute and instrumental
(i.e. without any positive and/or constructive force). One can speak of the
temporality of violence in Arendt only with regard to its future-oriented char-
acter; instrumental violence seeks justification from the future goal of politi-
cal emancipation. Apart from this future-orientedness, Arendt’s analysis of
violence does not (and cannot) engage in the important question of tempor-
ality because she is not concerned with the effects of violence as experienced
by the people. The question of the temporality of violence becomes available
as a topic of reflection when one seeks to understand how violence operates
and effects the lives of the people as configuring their past, present and future,
that is, in the spirit of Fanon’s analysis in WWUV.
Nicolas De Warren (2006, 32) rightly stresses that Arendt’s failure to make
sense of Fanon’s engagement with anticolonial violence has to do with her
unwillingness to recognize the colonial situation as already violent. I read this
unwillingness as part of her unresponsive response, which I alluded to earlier
(see p.5). As I have pointed out, one’s affective responsiveness to violence is
interconnected with how one frames violence. On this point Butler writes:
Affects… become not just the basis, but the very stuff of ideation and of critique. In
this way, a certain interpretive act implicitly takes hold at moments of primary
affective responsiveness. Interpretation does not emerge as the spontaneous act
of a single mind, but as a consequence of a certain field of intelligibility that
helps to form and frame our responsiveness to the world. (Butler 2010, 34, empha-
sis mine)
Here, Butler underscores that one’s affective relation with a particular
issue has a direct link to how that issue is interpreted, and in that sense,
interpretations are not individualized personal opinions about a certain
topic but arise from a field of intelligibility that governs the context where
the issue comes forth. Because this field of intelligibility is woven with
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with Butler’s above analysis, I argue the multidimensional aspects and
impacts of colonial violence in Algeria were intelligible to Fanon, but were
unintelligible to Arendt, and this is precisely why they differ in their affective
responses to colonial violence, as well as in the way they frame that violence.
In his Fanon and the Crisis of the EuropeanMan, Lewis Gordon explores the
conditions of such unintelligibility and regards it as the epistemic effect of living
in a world imbued with racism. Gordon (1995, 38) formulates unintelligibility
as one of the epistemic effects of racism. Fanon understood that for most Euro-
pean intellectuals, the racist structure of colonial violencewas invisible. Fanon’s
affective articulation of violence is a forceful response to make visible the psy-
chosocial impact of this colonial racism on black and Arab subjectivities.
Fanon is also very clear in pointing out that the colonial world is inhabited
by two different kinds of species (2004, 1). The splitting of the human species
into two is the hallmark of colonial violence. Fanon’s experience of and
reflections on the multidimensional operations of colonial violence suggested
to him that the question of violence could never be articulated in abstract
terms, i.e. as a problem of the human, as was the case with Arendt at
times. As Nelson Maldonado-Torres correctly suggests, “Fanon adopts a
different attitude from that of liberal humanism: instead of talking about
Man, he approaches black people” (2008, 97).
In contrast, Arendt’s reflections on violence, as manifested inOn Violence,
are abstractly construed. And her understanding of politics is built upon the
distinction between the political and the social spheres, which inform her
framing of violence. However, there is no political sphere in the Arendtian
sense in colonized Algeria. Her distinction is not applicable to the colonial
context because the political domain is not constituted by speech and collec-
tive public reasoning of the citizens. Hence, her criticism of Fanon issues from
her failure to understand the lived experience of the colonized. Accordingly,
Arendt does not consider decolonization through armed struggle as a legiti-
mate political goal, since she does not attend to the effects of colonial vio-
lence. As a result, Arendt misinterprets Fanon as praising violence.
Next, I discuss two interpretations by Fanonian scholars, Kawash and
Roberts, whose works sharply demonstrate the power of the Arendtian para-
digm within contemporary theorizations of violence.
Fanonian interpretations caught in thewebof theArendtian binary of violence
In her essay “Terrorists and Vampires: Fanon’s Spectral Violence of Decolo-
nization”, Kawash, at first, stresses “Fanon understands revolutionary acts
within the context of their ends” (1999, 236, emphasis mine). These
remarks belong to her reading of Fanon’s (1965) “Algeria Unveiled” (AU)
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suggesting that acts of violence, as represented in AU, are instrumental and
revolutionary because they aim at ending the colonial condition. Although
Kawash at first stresses the instrumental nature of violence in AU, as she
moves on to her analysis of Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, she articulates
an “order of violence” that is non-instrumental:
This violence of decolonization, a violence that destroys the colonial world to
make way for a new humanity, cannot be comprehended in terms of quantities
of instrumental violence. In relation to the instrumental violence whereby the
colonized opposes the rule of the colonizer, the violence of decolonization
appears as another order of violence altogether. (Kawash 1999, 237, emphasis
mine)
She suggests these “two orders of violence” (instrumental and non-instru-
mental/absolute) do not refer to a qualitative distinction. Non-instrumental
violence refers to a moment in which instrumental violence gains a transfor-
mative force, exceeding the reactive/instrumental violence of the colonized.
She thus argues this transformative/absolute order of violence cannot be con-
strued as instrumental insofar as it has the constructive role of decolonization
(238). Kawash therefore identifies two orders of violence in Fanon’s thought.
The first she refers to as “instrumental violence”, whereby the colonized
opposes the rule of the colonizer. The second she refers to as “absolute vio-
lence” or “the violence of decolonization.” This is transformative, excessive
violence, which is absolute in the sense that it destroys the entire colonial
structure (237). She underscores that this violence is “outside means and
ends” (238).
Kawash clearly identifies two orders of anticolonial violence in Fanon’s
body of work: instrumental/reactive/destructive and non-instrumental/absol-
ute/constructive. It is on this point that I disagree with Kawash. To claim that
a certain form of violence is instrumental does not mean it is not capable of
changing a social context. Such reasoning belongs to the Arendtian either/or
framework, where violence, as instrumental, is incapable of change. Fanon,
however, is explicit about the simultaneously instrumental and constructive
nature of anticolonial violence. He writes: “the colonized man liberates
himself in and through violence. This praxis enlightens the militant because
it shows him the means and the end” (2004, 44). As Fanon suggests, this vio-
lence liberates (i.e. it is constructive) only because it shows the colonized “the
means and the end” (i.e. it is instrumental).
Rather than identifying two orders of anticolonial violence in Fanon’s
work, as Kawash does, I suggest Fanon’s treatment of anticolonial violence
is strictly instrumental. Its instrumental character, however, has a liberating
and/or constructive effect. The violence of anticolonial struggle as a means of
national liberation liberates the colonized, and thus opens up the possibility
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of transforming the colonial world into a decolonized one. Therefore, it is not
the violence itself that is constructive but, rather, its effect – as a cleansing and
disintoxicating force (Fanon 2004, 51).
Although Kawash claims to be closer to Fanon in her thinking, she strays
into an Arendtian way of conceptualizing instrumentality. Just like Arendt,
she maintains that instrumental violence cannot have a positive/constructive
effect. In contrast, I consider the constructive aspect of violence through its
instrumentality, i.e. its effect. This allows me to move beyond the Arendtian
binary of instrumental/non-instrumental violence by way of concentrating on
the question of temporality – between the instrumental and constructive
aspects of anticolonial violence. Overall, I think the brilliance of Fanon’s
frame of violence lies in opening a theoretical ground for conceptualizing
various temporalities of violence; this cannot be done on the basis of
either/or frameworks, such as Arendt’s, which construe causality in rather
narrow terms.
Among scholars who write on Fanon’s conception of violence, Neil
Roberts stands out for attaching an intrinsic value to violence. Roberts
begins his essay “Fanon, Sartre, Violence and Freedom” by stressing the ten-
dency in the Fanon scholarship to construe Fanon’s views on violence as
instrumental. His argument intends to serve as a counter-attack to this ten-
dency in the Fanon scholarship. Roberts sets another, related goal: dis-
tinguishing Fanon’s understanding of violence from Arendt’s. Hence,
Roberts, echoing Arendt’s claims about Fanon, argues violence is not instru-
mental in Fanon, and also it differs from Arendt’s conception of violence. In
doing so, Roberts delimits himself to two conceptions of violence – instru-
mental and intrinsic (2004, 144) – and sets himself up to choose one or the
other. He thus writes:
Intrinsic violence, in contrast to instrumental violence, refers to a metaphysical
concept in which the act of either random irrational or calculated rational violence
itself contains inherent value. Intrinsic violence operates outside the means-ends
continuum… Intrinsic violence places positive value on a violent act irrespective
of the outcome at a specific moment of implementation. (Roberts 2004, 146)
Roberts suggests intrinsic violence is valuable in itself; it does not refer to
ends, since it is not construed as a means. I contend that when Roberts
suggests violence has intrinsic value for Fanon, he oversteps Fanon’s claim
by decontextualizing violence, as if violence for Fanon does not serve a
specific end. Furthermore, Roberts’ argument conflates the intrinsic necessity
of violence with the intrinsic value of violence. Roberts writes, “constructing
violence as intrinsically necessary [is] to enact a new humanism” (2004, 149).
However, arguing there is a necessity to use violence (as Fanon does) is differ-
ent from arguing for an intrinsic value beyond instrumentality. Although
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Roberts writes that his “claim is that a concept of intrinsic violence best
explains the necessary use of violence in Fanonian political theory” (2004,
147), in developing his account, he is instead referring to what violence
accomplishes:
Violence actualizes the realization of political independence and decolonization
since it reveals the reality of capitalist/colonial violence, communicates effectively
to the colonial oppressor, and clears the foundation on which a new order may
be built. Lastly, violence creates a new humanity through building a national iden-
tity. (Roberts 2004, 149)
The above remarks by Roberts are an interpretation of Fanon’s
description of violence as a “cleansing force”, but according to Fanon,
violence has this effect insofar as it is geared towards an end. Violence
cleanses because people in struggle “realize that liberation was the
achievement of each and every one” (Fanon 2004, 51). Fanon’s positive
configuration of violence is only possible in the context of anticolonial
struggle; thus, it is always conceived in terms of its goal, i.e. national
independence. Hence, to argue for a form of violence “outside the
means-ends continuum” would be to miss Fanon’s point. Let me clarify
my objections to Roberts’ assumptions and arguments: to argue that,
for Fanon, violence is necessary: (1) does not require attaching an intrin-
sic value (ontological/existential value) to violence; and (2) to argue vio-
lence has a “cleansing force”, as Fanon does, does not entail placing it
beyond instrumentality.
I contend that in juxtaposing Arendt and Fanon’s conceptions of violence,
Roberts goes too far in attributing an “intrinsic value” to Fanonian violence.
To argue that, for Fanon, violence is intrinsically valuable not only misrepre-
sents Fanon’s views on violence, but also undermines the force of Fanon’s
argument, which asserts the necessity of violence on the basis of anticolonial
struggle. In contrast to Roberts, who ascribes an intrinsic value to Fanon’s
anticolonial violence, I argue violence, for Fanon, is instrumental and its
instrumentality has a constructive, positive effect, for it liberates the colo-
nized individuals by showing them the possibility of changing the world
where they suffer.
Armed anticolonial mobilization is the first necessary step for decoloniza-
tion, motivated by a collective national consciousness, uniting a collective
body of people through a national cause. But how can one be sure that
this collective consciousness and national cause is free of the old structures
and relations of European colonial exploitation? In the final passages of
The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon addresses this issue. In proposing a
“new humanity”, he speaks of a new understanding of man, one that is
not modelled on Europe (2004, 235). Fanon addresses the newly liberated
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colonized of the Third World, as they are on the verge of creating them-
selves anew with the abolition of colonialism. According to him, for some-
thing new to be possible, the colonized have to reconstitute their identity.
This time, they have to cleanse themselves of the violence that previously
constituted their world. The stripping away of physical as well as epistemic
violence, then, would be the necessary first step for this “new humanity” to
emerge. This very point, however, cannot arise from Kawash and Roberts’
interpretations, because for both of them the violence of anticolonial
struggle has a positive value in itself, i.e. not as a means and a condition
of the possibility of a new society. Hence, I suggest their characterizations
of Fanon’s thought prevent them from recognizing this insight about the
conditions of possibility of Fanon’s “new humanity.”
Conclusion
In this article, I suggest Arendt’s characterization of violence as instru-
mental has pushed some scholars to the position of treating Fanon’s
account of violence as non-instrumental. In contradistinction to these
critics, I argue Fanon’s framing of anticolonial violence is strictly instru-
mental, but not in the Arendtian sense. Fanon’s notion of instrumental-
ity, in contrast to Arendt’s, implies violence can have a positive,
constructive effect. I demonstrate that addressing the question of violence
through the either/or framework of the instrumental/non-instrumental
binary, as Arendt does, cannot capture the depth of Fanon’s theorization
of violence.
Arendt, dismissing the violent colonial context that Fanon discusses,
claims that, for Fanon, violence is justified on the ground of creativity.
Arendt thus fails to acknowledge that Fanon’s call for violence does not
attempt to create violence but, rather, aims to prevent the violence that is
already present in the structure of the colonial society. In order to develop
these points, I pose the difference between Arendt and Fanon by deploying
Butler’s notions of “frame” and “affective responsiveness.” I further argue
Fanon’s framing of violence is affectively responsive to the effects of colonial
violence by way of its focus on the multidimensional character of violence –
in particular, the temporal dimension of what violence does to the subjectiv-
ity of the person, as she relates to the past, present and future, while sur-
rounded by a violent world. It is my contention that attending to such
differences in how violence is framed can cultivate insights as to how one
can make better sense of alternative responses to violence in the current
global context, where violence is increasingly multidimensional and
multifunctional.
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